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RETHINKING CONSTITUTIONALITY IN
EDUCATION RIGHTS CASES 
Joshua E. Weishart 
ABSTRACT 
Education rights cases often devolve into a farce of 
constitutional brinkmanship played by a miserable cast of 
reluctant courts and recalcitrant legislatures. Between successive 
rounds of litigation and tepid legislative fixes, come threats of 
impeaching judges, closing schools, stripping courts of 
jurisdiction, and holding legislators in contempt. Despite all the 
bluster, judges and legislators both anxiously await the curtain 
call, when they can bow out and terminate the matter. In the end, 
what passes for constitutionality in the successful cases is a 
school funding scheme judged “reasonably likely” or 
“reasonably calculated” to achieve an adequate or equitable 
education—as opposed to a public education system that is 
adequate and equitable. But rather than reflect the reality that 
adequacy and equity are interminable demands, these cases 
reflect a failure to confront and blunt that reality for 
disadvantaged children. 
The trouble lies in a judicial exit strategy focused on a 
fixed point of compliance—a state of being constitutional—that 
is altogether misplaced and counterproductive when the object is 
educational adequacy and equity. This Article proposes that the 
focus instead should be on whether the state maintains fidelity 
with those guarantees. That reconception counsels courts to 
entertain periodic exercises of jurisdiction. Between these 
periodic exercises of jurisdiction, interim remedies—data 
collection and public engagement projects—should gauge and 
sustain the state’s fidelity with the constitutional guarantees. 
         Professor of Law and Policy, College of Law and John D. Rockefeller IV School of 
Policy and Politics, West Virginia University. My thanks to the editors for the invitation to 
publish this Article for the 2018 Arkansas Law Review Symposium, “Hiding in Plain Sight: 
What Education Reform Needs.”  
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More fundamentally, this reconception requires transformative 
thinking, beginning with an acknowledgment that the end goal 
in these cases should be progress towards a goal without end. 
I. INTRODUCTION
“It feels weird to say it’s done, after all this time,” said 
Stephanie McCleary, mother of two, who challenged the 
constitutionality of Washington’s K-12 school funding system.1  
When Stephanie and her husband initiated the lawsuit in 2007, 
their son Carter was seven and their daughter Kelsey was 
thirteen; when the court finally terminated the case in 2018, 
Kelsey had already graduated from college and Carter had 
graduated from high school.2  It felt somewhat like a hollow 
victory, not just for her family, leaving Stephanie to wonder, 
“What does ‘done’ mean?”3 
For even as the court terminated the case, Stephanie and 
her attorney insisted it “didn’t rule on whether the state’s plan 
actually fulfills the constitutional definition of ‘ample’ 
funding.”4  The definition of ample funding and its alleged 
denial to a million-plus K-12 children was the basis of the 
McClearys’ original petition.5  Decades earlier, the Washington 
Supreme Court had declared that ample funding was the State’s 
“mandatory,” “affirmative,” and “paramount” duty.6  Decades 
later, when McCleary reached the high court, it reiterated that 
ample meant “fully sufficient” funding, enough to guarantee to 
“each and every child” a “constitutionally adequate education” 
that provides “the opportunity” to meet the State’s education 
standards.7  This paramount duty is “the State’s first and highest 
priority before any other State programs or operations.”8 
1. . Joseph O’Sullivan, Washington Supreme Court Ends Long-running McCleary
Education Case Against the State, SEATTLE TIMES (June 9, 2018), 
https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/washington-supreme-court-ends-100000-per-
day-sanctions-against-state-in-mccleary-education-case/ [https://perma.cc/L924-DPRZ]. 
2. . Id.
3. . Id.
4. . Id.
5. . See McCleary v. State, 269 P.3d 227, 244–45 (Wash. 2012).
6. . See Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71, 85 (Wash. 1978). 
7. . See McCleary, 269 P.3d at 249, 251–53. 
8. . Id. at 249. 
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The court unanimously agreed with the McClearys that the 
state had failed to fulfill that duty.9  The school funding 
formulas were not calibrated to meet the actual costs of 
providing an adequate education, resulting in the underfunding 
of teacher salaries, transportation, instructional materials, and 
other operating costs.10  The State had instead “relied heavily on 
local levies to fill the gap in funding,” especially for teacher 
salaries.11  Local districts were thereby forced “to turn 
increasingly to excess levies”—property rich districts were able 
to do so, property poor districts could not—”thus affecting the 
equity of a statewide system.”12  Therefore, the court concluded, 
the State must undertake “fundamental reforms” to address these 
issues and satisfy “its constitutional obligation to its students.”13 
That conclusion, rendered in 2012, came too late for Kelsey 
McCleary, by then a high school senior, who would not benefit 
from any funding reforms.14  Younger brother Carter, then in 
middle school, would also not benefit from those reforms, which 
did not come for another six years, until 2018.  You see, rather 
than order specific reforms in its 2012 decision, the court 
deferred to the Legislature to devise the appropriate K-12 
funding system remedies.15  A majority of the court, 
nevertheless, elected to retain jurisdiction to monitor 
implementation.16  “This option,” the majority said, “strikes the 
appropriate balance between deferring to the legislature to 
determine the precise means for discharging its [constitutional] 
duty, while also recognizing this court’s constitutional 
obligation” to ensure compliance.17  The court also required the 
Legislature to submit periodic reports on its progress.18 
9. . See id. at 261.
10. . See id. at 253–58. 
11. . Id. at 257. 
12. . McCleary, 269 P.3d at 252-53. 
13. . See id. at 258.
14. . See Donna Gordon Blankinship, What the Education-funding Lawsuit Means to 
Moms, THE SEATTLE TIMES (Sept. 12, 2016) [https://perma.cc/7NRT-RMCQ]. 
15. . See McCleary, 269 P.3d at 260–61. 
16. . Id. at 261. 
17. . Id. 
18. . McCleary v. State, No. 84362-7, at 2 (Wash. Jul. 18, 2012) (order requiring the 
legislature to submit periodic reports) [https://perma.cc/SHT5-JYCR]. 
Order from Jul. 18, 2012 at 2, McCleary, 269 P.3d 227 (No. 84362-7) 
[https://perma.cc/SHT5-JYCR]. 
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In the six years that followed, “legislators and the governor 
dragged their heels,” failing to comply fully with the 2012 
decision.19  Just two years in, the court unanimously held the 
State in contempt for failing to submit a plan for full 
implementation of the required reforms.20  A year later, the 
Legislature remained obstinate, so the court took the 
unprecedented step of imposing a $100,000-per-day fine until 
the State complied.21  Meanwhile, three Supreme Court justices 
faced challenges in the 2016 election, their challengers recruited 
by a state representative who viewed McCleary as a judicial 
overreach.22  Not to be outdone, the McClearys’ attorney 
suggested that the court should ratchet up the contempt 
sanctions, threaten to shut down schools or invalidate billions in 
previously enacted corporate tax breaks, unless or until the state 
complied.23  
The brinkmanship eventually gave way to action and cooler 
heads prevailed.  The three incumbent justices won reelection, 
the court did not impose more drastic contempt sanctions, and, 
in 2017, the Legislature enacted a K-12 budget under new 
formulas that the court then determined would fund the 
components of a basic education and “achieve constitutional 
compliance” when “fully implemented.”24  The only matter 
delaying full implementation at that point was when the 
Legislature would be required to fund increases in teacher and 
staff salaries to bring compensation to market levels.25  The 
State wanted until the 2019-20 school year to phase in the full 
$2.2 billion salary increase, but the court insisted on full 
19. . O’Sullivan, supra note 1.
20. . McCleary v. State, No. 84362-7, at 4 (Wash. Sept. 11, 2014) (order finding the
State in contempt for failing to comply with a previous order) [https://perma.cc/DP5C-
GXRU]. 
21. . McCleary v. State, No. 84362-7, at 9-10 (Wash. Aug. 13, 2015) (order assessing 
a $100,000 per day penalty on the State of Washington) [https://perma.cc/4CVC-XXZE]. 
22. . Sara Hayden, Electing the Bench: An Analysis of the Possible Negative Effects 
of Judicial Elections on Hawai’i’s Legal Community, 18 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 114, 
134 (2016). 
23. . Melissa Santos, Why $67 Million Fine Isn’t Motivating the Legislature to Act,
THE NEWS TRIBUNE (Jun. 13, 2017) [https://perma.cc/3NDY-49AP]. 
24. . McCleary v. State, No. 84362-7, at 1 (Wash. Nov. 15, 2017) (order 
acknowledging the State of Washington’s progress in the McCleary matter) 
[https://perma.cc/WW7A-SZUB]. 
25. . Id. at 2. 
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implementation by its September 1, 2018 deadline.26  
Lawmakers relented, appropriating the full funds for the new 
salary allocation model by the start of the 2018-19 school year.27  
That brought the State into compliance with the court’s prior 
orders in the case—even the McClearys agreed—and “therefore 
the State’s appeal” could at last “come to an end.”28  More than 
a decade after the case was initiated, the court lifted its contempt 
sanctions and terminated its jurisdiction.29 
By nearly every traditional measure, the McClearys had 
prevailed.  The court reaffirmed and elaborated on children’s 
“positive constitutional right” to education, explaining that it (i) 
imposes a duty compelling, rather than restraining, government 
action to provide an adequate education and (ii) obligates “the 
court to take a more active stance in ensuring that the State 
complies with its affirmative constitutional duty.”30  And the 
court remained steadfast in its demands that the State fulfill its 
paramount duty despite staunch opposition and noncompliance 
from the other coordinate branches of government.  The court 
did not flinch in imposing contempt sanctions that the State was 
forced to set aside in a separate account—$105 million of which 
the State appropriated for teacher salaries and special education 
costs.31 
In total, lawmakers increased state funding for K-12 
education by more than $8 billion.32  That additional funding 
will help pay for all-day kindergarten, reduced K-3 class sizes, 
enhanced transportation, increased funding for exceptional and 
special needs students, and market-based salaries for teachers, 
among other things.33  Overall spending per pupil “increased 
from $6,655 in 2010 to $9,344 in 2018.”34  As a result, “more 
26. . Id. at 2, 41–42. 
27. . McCleary v. State, No. 84362-7, at 2–3 (Wash. June 7, 2018) (order lifting the
$100,000 per day penalty against the State of Washington) [https://perma.cc/3KVL-L4YS]. 
28. . Id. at 3–4. 
29. . Id. at 4. 
30. . McCleary, 269 P.3d at 247–48. 
31. . Order of Jun. 7, 2018, supra note 27, at 3. The court declined plaintiffs’ request
to order the state “to pay prejudgment interest on the accrued sanctions.” Id. at 4. 
32. . See Order of Nov. 15, 2017, supra note 24, at 23 (from $13.4 billion when
McCleary was decided in 2012 to $22 billion when it was terminated in 2018). 
33. . See id. at 28–40. 
34. . Id. at 23. 
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than half of the state’s operating budget will go to public schools 
for the first time in nearly 25 years.”35 
So why were Stephanie McCleary and her attorney 
unwilling to accept this outcome as a complete and total victory? 
Because they contended that the court did not determine that the 
new funding formulas were, in fact, fully sufficient to guarantee 
all children a constitutionally adequate education.36  Yet that 
was the impression conveyed by the court putting its imprimatur 
on the new formula, formally approving the state’s actions, and 
terminating the case.37  Before the court ended its jurisdiction, 
there was already some evidence to suggest that the new school 
finance scheme was not, in fact, adequately or equitably 
funded.38  Indeed, within months of the court’s ruling, teachers 
in multiple school districts went on strike when contract 
negotiations failed over the $2 billion allocated for increased 
teacher salaries.39  For some districts, the overriding sense was 
35. . Jim Camden, Legislature Met Its Duty on Public Schools, Supreme Court Says, 
THE SPOKESMAN-REVIEW (Jun. 8, 2018), 
http://www.spokesman.com/stories/2018/jun/07/legislature-met-its-duty-on-public-
schools-supreme/ [https://perma.cc/W2YN-URR]. 
36. . Id. 
37. . See, e.g., id.; They Did It! Washington Has Finally Fully Funded Education, 
MYNORTHWEST (Jun. 7, 2018), http://mynorthwest.com/1012718/washington-fully-funds-
education-mccleary/ [https://perma.cc/V85J-ESP9]; Emily Boerger, Supreme Court Rules 
Legislature Finally in Full Compliance with the McCleary Decision, WASHINGTON STATE 
WIRE (Jun. 7, 2018), https://washingtonstatewire.com/supreme-court-rules-legislature-
finally-in-full-compliance-with-the-mccleary-decision/ [https://perma.cc/9DYH-SS42].   
38. . See Brief of Amicus Curiae, Washington’s Paramount Duty, 1-8, McCleary, 269
P.3d 227 (No. 84362-7); Bill Keim, Commentary: School funding lawsuit over but not its 
headaches, THE HEARLD (Jun. 24, 2018), 
https://www.heraldnet.com/opinion/commentary-school-funding-lawsuit-over-but-not-its-
headaches/ [https://perma.cc/ULF5-ZVES]; The Editorial Board, McCleary is over, but 
work to improve education in Washington is not, THE SEATTLE TIMES (Jun. 7, 2018) 
[https://perma.cc/Q5ZV-QXXL]; BRUCE D. BAKER ET AL., IS SCHOOL FUNDING FAIR? A
NATIONAL REPORT CARD 17, 26 (7th ed. 2018) [https://perma.cc/ZXB8-UP9C].
39. . See Sarah Schwartz, Washington State Teachers Strike Over Salary 
Negotiations, EDUCATION WEEK (Aug. 29, 2018), 
http://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/teacherbeat/2018/08/washington_state_teachers_strike.htm
l [https://perma.cc/793Y-4DTR]; Melissa Hellman, Seattle Public Schools and Teachers’ 
Unions Spar Over Alleged Deficits, SEATTLE WEEKLY (Aug. 6, 2018), 
http://www.seattleweekly.com/news/seattle-public-schools-and-teachers-unions-spar-of-
alleged-deficits/ [https://perma.cc/39PY-QQ98]; Neal Morton, Washington State’s Teacher 
Contract Chaos was Inevitable, YAKIMAHEARLD.COM (Sept. 1, 2018), 
https://www.yakimaherald.com/news/education/analysis-washington-state-s-teacher-
contract-chaos-was-inevitable/article_f6449dca-ae6e-11e8-8df4-77aeebe6aad4.html 
[https://perma.cc/SFY6-E8L4].
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that “the state gave with one hand and took with another” in 
order to comply with McCleary.40 
The Washington Supreme Court accepted that there might 
be funding disparities remaining after the State had achieved full 
compliance its orders.41  But the court said it was “willing to 
allow the State’s program to operate and let experience be the 
judge of whether it proves adequate.”42  That was acceptable, the 
court reasoned, because the standard it had adopted for 
constitutionality was whether the State “acted within the broad 
range of its policy discretion in a manner that ‘achieves or is 
reasonably likely to achieve’ the constitutional end of amply 
funding K-12 basic education.”43  And so, the State did not 
actually need to achieve ample funding, provided it could show 
that its funding formulas were at least reasonably likely to 
achieve ample funding. 
This ‘reasonably likely’ or ‘reasonably calculated’ to 
achieve standard is fast becoming the benchmark for 
constitutionality in education rights cases, particularly in the 
latter remedial stages of adequacy suits.44  Most state high courts 
have abandoned heightened scrutiny and the tiers of scrutiny 
altogether, even when the right to education has been deemed 
fundamental under the state constitution.45  A number of state 
courts have increasingly turned instead to an ad-hoc, often-
unannounced, less proscriptive standard that scrutinizes the 
reasonableness of the fit between the legislative means and the 
constitutional ends (adequacy and equity), with little or no 
scrutiny of the means or the ends themselves.46  As I explain in 
Part II, this reasonable fit standard is ill-suited to the task of 
determining constitutionality in education rights cases because it 
is predicated on a fixed point of compliance for educational 
adequacy and equity—variable constitutional ends that cannot 
40. . See Jim Allen, For school systems, McCleary Decision Gave with One Hand
and Took with the Other, THE SPOKESMAN-REVIEW (Sept. 9, 2018), 
http://www.spokesman.com/stories/2018/sep/09/for-school-systems-confusion-and-angst-
mix-with-re/ [https://perma.cc/B3XN-T7RK].  
41. . See Order of Nov. 15, 2017, supra note 24, at 28–39. 
42. . Id. at 37. 
43. . Id. (quoting McCleary, 269 P.3d at 248).
44. . See Joshua E. Weishart, Equal Liberty in Proportion, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV.
215, 243–59 (2017). 
45. . See id. 
46. . See id. at 260–66. 
502 ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol.  72:2 
be so neatly circumscribed.  I propose a new approach in Part 
III, one geared towards sustaining demonstrable and durable 
fidelity to those constitutional ends. 
II. FIXED CONSTITUTIONALITY, ENDLESS
CONSTITUTIONAL ENDS 
Courts achieve the pretense of reaching a fixed point of 
constitutional compliance in education rights by applying an 
unfixed, rather loose standard. As a measure of constitutionality, 
the reasonable fit standard licenses considerable discretion and 
latitude; its contours remain fluid, and deliberately so.  All of 
this elasticity increases the likelihood of inconsistent rulings 
over time.  Perhaps most problematic for a standard that was 
developed partly to address justiciability concerns, it is “at once 
more and less deferential to the legislature than state separation 
of powers doctrine commands.”47 
It is less deferential whenever the legislative means are not 
reasonably likely to achieve the constitutional ends of 
educational adequacy and equity because then courts are 
compelled to pass judgment on the legislative means—a 
separation of powers boundary that courts have drawn for 
themselves and have been unwilling to cross, at least directly.48  
It is more deferential whenever the case enters the remedial and 
contempt phases because courts, by then weary from extended 
showdowns with the legislature, have been inclined to find the 
legislative means reasonably likely to achieve the constitutional 
ends despite persistent educational deprivations and 
disparities.49  In such instances, the reasonable fit standard 
permits the court to excuse objectionable deprivations and 
disparities in the short term on the prospect that they might be 
cured, without providing any mechanism for assuring sustained 
progress in the long term.50 
47. . Joshua E. Weishart, Aligning Education Rights and Remedies, 27 KAN. J. L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 346, 382 (2018). 
48. . See id. 
49. . See id. at 382–83. 
50. . See Weishart, supra note 44, at 289–90. 
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For these and other reasons, I have elsewhere proposed a 
new constitutional standard of review51 as well as remedial 
standards for evaluating legislative and judicial remedies52—all 
of which focus more on scrutinizing progress towards the 
constitutional ends than on the reasonableness of their fit with 
the legislative means. 
Assuming that reasonable fit emerges as the prevailing 
standard, however, it should be a test for conditional 
compliance, not for constitutionality.  That is how the 
“reasonably calculated” standard operates, for instance, in 
special education cases.  To comply with the Individuals with 
Disabilities Education Act, the school district must offer an 
individualized education plan “reasonably calculated to enable a 
child to make progress appropriate in light of the child’s 
circumstances.”53  The standard contemplates that the degree of 
a child’s grade-to-grade progress along with changes to his or 
her circumstances affect an IEP’s statutory compliance year to 
year.54  Likewise, the “reasonably calculated” standard for 
determining “appropriate action” under the Equal Opportunity 
Education Act for limited English proficient students is 
conditioned on whether the school’s program “produce[s] results 
indicating that the language barriers confronting students are 
actually being overcome” after a “sufficient” time period.55 
Misapplication of the reasonable fit standard as a test for 
constitutionality rather than conditional compliance  invites at 
least three problems: (1) It distorts the norm and expectations of 
constitutionality; (2) It indulges rather perverse presumptions 
51. . See id. at 292 (proposing “direct-proportionality review [that] entails a two-part 
inquiry. First, do the state’s actions advance children’s equality and liberty interests by 
ensuring that vertical equity and adequacy maintain a mutually reinforcing, upward 
trajectory? Second, is the margin between vertical equity and adequacy proportional so as 
to protect children from the harms of educational disparities?”).  
52. . See Weishart, supra note 47, at 353 (proposing “direct proportionality standard” 
for “a court’s review of legislative remedies intended to cure violations of the state 
constitutional right to education” and a “reasonable congruence standard” for “courts in 
contemplating or reviewing injunctive relief to cure [such] violations”).  
53. . Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988, 999 
(2017). 
54. . Id. at 999 (“Progress through this system is what our society generally means by 
an ‘education.’ False Accordingly,. . .an IEP typically should. . . be reasonably calculated 
to enable the child to achieve passing marks and advance from grade to grade.”) (internal 
quotations and citation omitted).  
55. . See Castaneda v. Pickard, 648 F.2d 989, 1010 (5th Cir. 1981).
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and burdens in favor of repeated rights offenders; and (3) It 
foments the misguided belief that constitutionality can be fixed 
for educational adequacy and equity. 
A. Constitutionality Distorted
The reasonable fit standard distorts both the norm and 
expectations of constitutionality in education rights cases. 
Constitutionality is commonly understood as the “quality, state, 
or condition of being” in accordance with the constitution.56  
The Washington Supreme Court was decidedly not saying that 
its K-12 system had an achieved such a quality, state, or 
condition when it concluded that the new 2017-18 funding 
formulas had satisfied the reasonable fit standard.  According to 
the court’s 2012 McCleary decision, full compliance with its 
constitution will not be reached until the State has adequately 
and equitably funded education such that “each and every child” 
has an “opportunity” to obtain certain judicially-approved and 
legislatively-enacted educational “outcomes.”57  The state 
constitution does not mandate that every child actually achieve 
those educational outcomes, just that they have a fair and 
meaningful opportunity to achieve them.58  But to judge whether 
such opportunity exists, courts must scrutinize both educational 
inputs and outcomes over time.59  That assessment of student 
56. . See Constitutionality, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); see also
Constitutionality, MERIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/constitutionality (defining constitutionality as “quality or state of 
being constitutional, especially: accordance with the provisions of a constitution”) 
[https://perma.cc/632B-Q8S9]. 
57. . McCleary v. State, 269 P.3d 227, 249, 251 (Wash. 2012).
58. . See id. at 251. 
59. . See, e.g., Gannon v. State, 390 P.3d 461, 488–89 (Kan. 2017) (“To determine 
whether the Gannon I test for adequacy is being met through implementation, it is 
appropriate to look—as did the panel—to both the financing system’s inputs, e.g., funding, 
and outputs, e.g., outcomes such as student achievement.”); Abbeville Cty. Sch. Dist. v. 
State, 767 S.E.2d 157, 167, 174–75 (S.C. 2014); Conn. Coal. for Justice in Educ. Funding, 
Inc. v. Rell, 990 A.2d 206, 289 (Conn. 2010) (“Measuring educational adequacy 
traditionally is accomplished by identifying input and/or output standards that serve as a 
measure of adequacy, then calculating the actual cost of attaining those inputs and/or 
outputs, a process referred to as ‘costing out.’”); Hoke Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. State, 599 
S.E.2d 365, 381 (N.C. 2004); Lake View v. Huckabee, 91 S.W.3d 472, 493 (Ark. 2002); 
Vincent v. Voight, 614 N.W.2d 388, 488 (Wisc. 2000); Carrollton-Farmers Branch Indep. 
Sch. Dist. v. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist., 826 S.W.2d 489, 529 (Tex. 1992) (“An efficient 
school system cannot be achieved through simple control of the inputs to the system (and 
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growth and achievement in both absolute and relative terms 
informs the court’s judgment about whether fair and meaningful 
educational opportunity exists. 
For this reason as well, the Washington Supreme Court said 
it needed to wait and see whether the new funding formulas 
were constitutionally adequate—whether they provided the 
requisite opportunity that the state constitution demands.60 
Unfortunately, as these news headlines show, that is not how the 
court’s ruling terminating its jurisdiction and lifting its contempt 
sanctions was interpreted: 
“They did it! Washington has finally fully funded 
education”61 
“Supreme court rules legislature finally in full compliance 
with the McCleary decision”62 
“Washington state school funding now legal, high court 
rules”63 
“Legislature met its duty on public schools, Supreme Court 
says”64 
It would be easy to dismiss these headlines as uninformed 
or sensational but for the fact that the Washington Supreme 
Court itself repeatedly characterized the legislature’s actions as 
certainly not through control of funding alone) the outputs of the system must be monitored 
and measured against a standard and the inputs must then be adjusted to correct any 
deficiencies.”); Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 of King Cty. v. State, 585 P.2d 71 (Wash. 1978); 
Robinson v. Cahill, 351 A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975) (“Ultimately a well-conceived educational 
system requires that educational goals be formulated, that decisions be made as to 
what inputs of human and material resources are required, that the resources be properly 
allocated among students according to their needs in light of the goals, and finally that the 
success of the system in achieving its educational goals be evaluated and, based upon that 
evaluation, the choice of educational goals, the decision as to resource needs, and the 
process of allocating resources to students be revised.”); Milliken v. Green, 212 N.W.2d 
711, 716 (Mich. 1973). 
60. . Order of Nov. 15, 2017, supra note 24, at 1.
61. . MYNORTHWEST (Jun. 7, 2018), http://mynorthwest.com/1012718/washington-
fully-funds-education-mccleary/?. 
62. . Emily Boerger, WASHINGTON STATE WIRE (Jun. 7, 2018), 
https://washingtonstatewire.com/supreme-court-rules-legislature-finally-in-full-
compliance-with-the-mccleary-decision [https://perma.cc/FE9J-ZTPX].  
63. . Rachel La Corte, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Jun. 7, 2018), 
https://www.oregonlive.com/pacific-northwest-
news/index.ssf/2018/06/washington_state_school_fundin.html [https://perma.cc/HC2F-
VFXE]. 
64. . Jim Camden, THE SPOKESMAN-REVIEW (updated Jun. 8, 2018), 
http://www.spokesman.com/ stories/2018/jun/07/legislature-met-its-duty-on-public-
schools-supreme/ [https://perma.cc/X3L7-ZPU3]. 
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being compliant, having adequately or fully funding key 
components of the basic education program—again even as the 
court was reserving the possibility that the new funding 
formulas were not constitutionally adequate: 
The “legislature enacted a funding system that, when fully 
implemented, will achieve constitutional compliance according 
to the benchmarks that have consistently guided judicial 
oversight.”65 
“The court concludes that the legislature has met the 
formulas. . .called for by [statute], and thus it is adequately 
funding that component of basic education.”66 
“In sum, . . .the State has satisfied the court’s mandate to 
fully fund the program of basic education established by 
[statute] in accordance with the formulas and benchmarks set 
forth in [statute] and this court’s orders.”67 
Misperception about the ruling bolstered by the unduly 
generous application of the reasonable fit standard not only 
distorted the norm and commonly understood meaning of 
constitutionality, it also now poses the risk of distorting the 
expectations of constitutionality.  If educational outcomes do not 
improve or only modestly improve in the State of Washington 
over the next few years, opponents will point to the protracted 
McCleary saga and say it was not worth it, either because 
“money doesn’t matter”68 or because courts can’t make a 
difference.69  Such criticisms will be based on the mistaken 
assumption that Washington had achieved constitutionally 
adequate funding in 2018.  Yet the influx of $8 billion into the 
K-12 education budget must be considered from the perspective
that, prior to McCleary, Washington had to a long way to go to
65. . Order of Nov. 15, 2017, supra note 24, at 1. 
66. . Id. at 29. 
67. . Id. at 37. 
68. . See Michael A. Rebell, Poverty, “Meaningful” Educational Opportunity, and 
the Necessary Role of the Courts, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1467, 1469 (2007) (“Insult is added to 
the injury being perpetrated on these students by the argument advanced by some critics of 
judicial efforts to rectify these inequities that ‘money doesn’t matter’ in overcoming 
educational disadvantages.”). 
69. . See Derek W. Black, Reforming School Discipline, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 66–
67 (2016) (“States argue that educational outcomes are more directly a product of student 
demographic variables and student effort [or,] to the extent money matters, the state has 
provided districts with sufficient funds and that the problem is local mismanagement.”).  
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reach even average student outcomes, much less constitutionally 
adequate outcomes.70 
Before the state enacted its new budget, analysis showed 
that Washington ranked in the bottom of states with a grade of 
“F” due to its low fiscal effort on education spending compared 
with its high fiscal capacity.71  The same analysis showed 
Washington ranked near the bottom on teacher wage 
competitiveness.72  And another report determined that, for poor 
school districts in the bottom twenty percent to reach average 
student outcomes, the State would need to increase funding by 
$10,500 per pupil.73  From that perspective, the $8 billion does 
not seem so grand or even adequate. 
Beyond the numbers, it matters that courts formulate 
constitutionality with care and precision because other courts, 
advocates, scholars, and state defendants pay attention to the net 
effect of these cases as well as the political costs incurred in the 
judicial-legislative showdowns they inevitably set off.  Some 
state courts are encouraged by the overall outcomes, like the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court which after decades of treating 
these cases as nonjusticiable, recently reversed course.74  But 
more courts lately are discouraged.  Courts in six states have 
surrendered entirely, refusing to even to entertain the merits of 
these cases which they perceive to entangle them in political 
70. . See Derek Black, The Washington Legislature May Have Gotten the Supreme 
Court Off Its Back, But Is It Funding Schools Adequately?, EDUCATION LAW PROF BLOG 
(Jun. 8, 2018), https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/education_law/2018/06/the-washington-
legislature-may-have-gotten-the-supreme-court-off-its-back-but-is-it-funding-schools-.html 
[https://perma.cc/85DJ-AV4P]. 
71. . BRUCE D. BAKER ET AL., IS SCHOOL FUNDING FAIR? A NATIONAL REPORT
CARD 7, (7th ed. 2018), 
http://www.edlawcenter.org/assets/files/pdfs/publications/Is_School_Funding_Fair_7th_Ed
iti.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZXB8-UP9C]. 
72. . Id. at  17. 
73. . BRUCE D. BAKER, ET AL., THE REAL SHAME OF THE NATION: THE CAUSES AND
CONSEQUENCES OF INTERSTATE INEQUITY IN PUBLIC SCHOOL INVESTMENTS 49 (2018), 
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1cm6Jkm6ktUT3SQplzDFjJIy3G3iLWOtJ/view 
[https://perma.cc/YN6J-69HK]. 
74. . William Penn Sch. Dist. v. Penn. Dep’t of Educ., 170 A.3d 414, 455 (Pa. 2017) 
(“These many decisions stand for the proposition that courts in a substantial majority of 
American jurisdictions have declined to let the potential difficulty and conflict that may 
attend constitutional oversight of education dissuade them from undertaking the task of 
judicial review.”). 
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questions reserved for the other coordinate branches.75  Equally 
troubling, a majority of courts are on the retreat.76  They either 
decline the opportunity to get involved, deny a constitutional 
violation despite substantial educational deprivations and 
disparities, or find a violation but then decline to specify a 
remedy or give any remedial guidance, out of deference to 
legislative prerogatives and separation of powers.77  Few courts 
are advancing in the battle, by not only finding a constitutional 
violation but also specifying a remedy or providing guidance 
about remedial measures to cure the violation.78 
The Washington Supreme Court is one of the few that have 
remained active, setting a rhythm and pace for others to follow. 
The concern raised here is that the court’s use of the reasonable 
fit standard—as a politically expedient test for constitutionality 
rather than conditional compliance—will ultimately undercut the 
judiciary’s role in education rights cases, which will set back the 
cause of educational justice. 
B. Perverse Presumptions and Burden Shifting
The reasonable fit standard indulges procedural inequities 
once the standard is satisfied and the court then terminates its 
jurisdiction.  At that point, a heavy burden of proof shifts back 
to aggrieved-yet-not-fully remediated rightholders, i.e., the 
children.  Meanwhile, courts will assume the continued good 
faith of a repeated-rights-offender dutyholder, i.e., the state, who 
otherwise remains insufficiently undeterred.  In a number of 
jurisdictions, the state is then further entitled to a presumption of 
constitutionality.79  Thereafter, would-be plaintiffs seeking to 
75. . See Ex parte James, 836 So. 2d 813, 819 (Ala. 2002); Coal. for Adequacy &
Fairness in Sch. Funding, Inc. v. Chiles, 680 So. 2d 400, 406–08 (Fla. 1996); Comm. for 
Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d 1178, 1190–93 (Ill. 1996); Neb. Coal. for Educ. Equity 
& Adequacy v. Heineman, 731 N.W.2d 164, 178–80 (Neb. 2007); Okla. Educ. Ass’n v. 
State, 158 P.3d 1058, 1066 (Okla. 2007); City of Pawtucket v. Sundlun, 662 A.2d 40, 57–
59 (R.I. 1995). 
76. . See Weishart, supra note 47, at 348.
77. . See id. 
78. . See id. 
79. . See Abbott by Abbott v. Burke (Abbott IV), 693 A.2d 417, 431-32 (N.J. 1997) 
(“We do not discount or minimize the State’s contention that. . .a legislative enactment. . .is 
entitled to a presumption of validity.”); DeRolph v. State (DeRolph I), 677 N.E.2d at 737 
(“We are aware that the General Assembly has the responsibility to enact legislation and 
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prove that the K-12 system remains inadequate or inequitable 
must overcome that presumption and reestablish causation, 
which can be exceedingly difficult in education rights cases.80 
The rejoinder that plaintiffs typically bear the burden of 
proof in the normal course of civil litigation overlooks the 
thumb that the reasonable fit standard places on the scales.81  It 
is because that standard has been satisfied that plaintiffs remain 
unsatisfactorily remediated.  At best, plaintiffs have been told 
that certain legislative measures may reasonably achieve 
constitutional adequacy and equity, not that they do or will. 
Under such circumstances, the fairer procedure would be to 
presume that the system remains unconstitutional (or 
conditionally constitutional), unless and until plaintiffs are fully 
remediated.  The reasonable fit standard provides no such 
failsafe.  Rather, it returns the parties procedurally to the status 
quo ante with all the attendant presumptions and burdens in the 
state’s favor.  This is especially problematic when, upon 
plaintiffs return to court, constitutionality will again be judged 
by the reasonable fit standard: “The presumption of 
constitutionality operates to supply the facts necessary to 
establish a law’s reasonableness” even when those facts do “not 
actually exist”—”all that is necessary is that a rational legislator 
that such legislation is presumptively valid. However, this does not mean that we may turn 
a deaf ear to any challenge to laws passed by the General Assembly.” (internal citations 
omitted)); Abbeville Cty. Sch. Dist. v. State (Abbeville II), 767 S.E.2d 157, 161 (S.C. 
2014) (“‘[A]ll statutes are presumed constitutional and, if possible, will be construed to 
render them valid.’ Accordingly, we will not find a statute unconstitutional unless ‘its 
repugnance to the Constitution is clear beyond a reasonable doubt.’”) (alteration in 
original) (quoting Curtis v. State, 549 S.E.2d 591, 597 (S.C. 2001))).  
The presumption would not typically apply when the challenged law affects a fundamental 
right. See, e.g., Yakima Cty. Deputy Sheriff’s Ass’n v. Bd. of Comm’rs for Yakima Cty., 
601 P.2d 936, 941 (Wash. 1979) (“[S]tatutes which affect constitutionally protected 
fundamental rights. . .do not enjoy such a presumption of constitutionality.”). A number of 
state courts, however, have either ruled that education is not a fundamental right or 
declined to decide the question. See Weishart, supra note 44, at Tables A–C, 244–54. 
80. . See Derek W. Black, The Constitutional Challenge to Teacher Tenure, 104 
CALIF. L. REV. 75, 107, 123-42 (2016) (explanation the difficulties of establishing that 
state policy or practice caused educational deprivations). 
81. . Cf. Edward C. Dawson, Adjusting the Presumption of Constitutionality Based on 
Margin of Statutory Passage, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 97, 113 (2013) (noting contention that 
application of strong presumption of constitutionality “would operate as a ‘thumb on the 
scale’ and might lead a judge to uphold a statute even if he had a fairly strong belief that it 
might be unconstitutional”). 
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could have reasonably thought that they exist.”82  Thus, the 
reasonable fit standard tips the scales on the backend of the 
litigation and on the frontend of successive litigation. 
The deference compelled by the presumption of 
constitutionality to legislative fact-finding may be entirely 
unwarranted in many education rights cases.  “Legislatures often 
enact legislation without engaging in any fact-finding, and even 
when legislatures do conduct fact-finding, the legislative agenda 
may drive fact-finding instead of the other way around.”83  
Legislatures enacting education budgets and funding formulas 
are no exception in that they “typically follow one of two paths: 
a majority rules democratic process that tends toward 
inequitable results, or a process driven by expert analysis that 
tends toward meeting student need.  Absent judicial oversight, 
the former has been the de facto rule in nearly all states.”84  And 
even when the legislature incorporates experts and “make good-
faith findings of fact,. . .[it] is unlikely to have devoted much 
attention to whether the factual circumstances underlying the 
legislation satisfy the. . .constitutional tests.”85 
Such measures of democratic accountability—another 
justification for attaching the presumption of constitutionality—
also seems misplaced in state education rights cases.86  At 
minimum, democratic accountability is less salient for state 
court judges, most of whom are “popularly elected and 
82. . See F. Andrew Hessick, Rethinking the Presumption of Constitutionality, 85 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1447, 1453 (2010) (emphasis added). 
83. . Id. at 1473–74. 
84. . Derek W. Black, Averting Educational Crisis: Funding Cuts, Teacher 
Shortages, and the Dwindling Commitment to Public Education, 94 WASH. U.L. REV. 423, 
476 (2016); see Montoy v. State, 120 P.3d 306, 310 (Kan. 2005) (per curiam) (“[T]he 
financing formula was not based upon actual costs to educate children but was instead 
based on former spending levels and political compromise.”); Campaign for Fiscal Equity, 
Inc. v. State, 801 N.E.2d 326, 347–48 (N.Y. 2003) (“[T]he political process allocates to 
City schools a share of state aid that does not bear a perceptible relation to the needs of 
City students.”). 
85. . Hessick, supra note 82, at 1474. 
86. . See id. at 1469 (noting justification supposes that “[a]ggressive judicial review
undermines this accountability by allowing the policy preferences of the judiciary to 
displace the policy preferences of the democratically accountable legislators.. . .Courts 
accordingly should restrain themselves from intervening,. . .and allow poor decisions to be 
worked out through the democratic process.”). 
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retained.”87  Yet even if the democratic accountability 
justification were more apt, the U.S. Supreme Court has 
explained that the presumption of constitutionality should 
restrain courts from intervening in democratic process “absent 
some reason to infer antipathy” by the political branches.88  
Such antipathy is surely present in many education rights cases 
focused on the adequacy and equity of school funding. 
State legislatures have chronically underfunded or 
defunded public education for decades.89  And then when they 
are finally held to give an account, it takes them years to comply 
with the court’s orders, as they kick and scream along the way. 
Consider the bruising school funding battles in Kansas, where 
legislators have tried to strip the court of jurisdiction, threatened 
to change the process of judicial selection, and have repeatedly 
sought to amend the state constitution to weaken the right to 
education.90  All of this in response to the Kansas Supreme 
Court trying to enforce that right rather than retreat as so many 
other courts have done.  If that does not provide a basis to infer 
antipathy, it is hard to imagine what else would besides more 
overt and invidious discrimination or animus. 
There is certainly no credible argument that the state, 
having once satisfied the reasonable fit standard, will be 
sufficiently deterred from backsliding on their promise to 
achieve and maintain adequate school funding levels.  The 
Washington Supreme Court acknowledged as much but 
shrugged off the concern, saying it was “the nature of the 
legislative process.”91  The court also said it “presumes the 
legislature will do its job until it demonstrates 
otherwise.”92  This is a stunningly obtuse statement considering 
the record before the court.  Were the preceding decades of 
87. . See Helen Hershkoff, Positive Rights and State Constitutions: The Limits of 
Federal Rationality Review, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1157-58 (1999) 
(“Countermajoritarian concerns may not be as uniformly salient in the state constitutional 
context, given variations among state court systems—states vary, among other things, in 
the way in which judges are recruited, selected, retained, and compensated—but they are 
all non-Article III decisionmakers.”). 
88. . Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979) (emphasis added). 
89. . See, e.g., Black, supra note 84, at 431–34. 
90. . Richard E. Levy, The War of Judicial Independence: Letters from the Kansas 
Front, 65 U. KAN. L. REV. 725, 725–267 (2017). 
91. . Order of Nov. 15, 2017, supra note 24, at 38. 
92. . Id. at 39. 
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underfunding not sufficient demonstration?  How about the 
1,365 days that the legislature was in contempt for failing to 
comply with the court’s orders?  Or the 1,029 days of which that 
the legislature incurred $100,000-per-day fines, was that not 
sufficient demonstration to avoid the presumption of 
constitutionality and good faith compliance? 
The balance of the equities simply does not weigh in favor 
of burdening not-fully-remediated plaintiffs with overcoming a 
presumption of constitutionality while benefiting repeated-
rights-offender defendants out of deference to their legislative 
acts and facts.  Yet that procedural inequity is exactly what the 
reasonable fit standard indulges when it inevitably leads courts 
to terminate their jurisdiction without any safeguards to deter 
future legislative transgressions. 
C. Terminating the Interminable
The reasonable fit standard operates on the misguided 
belief that constitutionality can be fixed for educational 
adequacy and equity such that once the standard is satisfied, the 
matter should be terminated.  That belief is misguided because 
equity and adequacy are comparative, dynamic, and 
interminable constitutional ends.  To make and judge progress 
towards adequacy and equity one necessarily has to compare 
“educational resources, opportunities, and outcomes of 
similarly-situated and differently-situated children.”93  That task 
is plainly comparative when you are trying to make distributions 
of educational opportunity more equitable, across school 
districts and especially between students with different needs. 
But it is also comparative when the object is for all students to 
have access to a quality or adequate education, one that will 
enable them to meet certain educational outcomes, become full, 
equal citizens and productive members of society. 
What it takes for a child to become an equal, productive 
citizen—where to set that adequacy baseline—invariably turns 
on what educational resources and opportunities other children 
93. . See Joshua E. Weishart, The Constitutionally Anomalous Right to Education, 
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF U.S. EDUCATION LAW (Kristine Bowman, ed., Oxford Univ. 
Press, forthcoming), http://bit.ly/2JYW1Ta. 
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have.94  Hence, below that baseline distributions aimed at 
achieving adequacy must be comparative.  Moreover, at a 
certain point large-scale disparities between children just at the 
adequacy baseline and those high above it will begin to 
undermine the ability of all children to function as equals and 
compete on fair terms for higher education and high-quality 
jobs.95  One must then make a comparative assessment to correct 
those disparities, which might require recalibrating and raising 
the adequacy baseline to diminish certain positional advantages 
held above it.96 
Adequacy and equity thus cannot be static concepts, they 
must be dynamic – evolving to meet the educational needs of an 
ever-changing society.97  A number of courts have so 
concluded,98  including notably the Washington Supreme 
Court.99  Thus, as Derek Black has explained, the temporal 
94. . See Weishart, supra note 44, at 240.
95. . Id. at 292. 
96. . Id. 
97. . Peter Enrich, Leaving Equality Behind: New Directions in School Finance
Reform, 48 VAND. L. REV. 101, 171 (1995) (observing that courts have recognized that 
questions of educational adequacy  “must change with evolving socia l and economic 
conditions and with changing societal expectations about the role of the schools. The 
standard of adequacy cannot be static.”). 
98. . Conn. Coal. for Justice in Educ. Funding, Inc. v. Rell, 990 A.2d 206, 255 (Conn. 
2010) (“The broad constitutional standard also reflects our recognition of the fact that the 
specific educational inputs or instrumentalities suitable to achieve this minimum level of 
education may well change over time.”); Montoy v. State, 120 P.3d 306, 309 (Kan. 2005) 
(“The Kansas Constitution thus imposes a mandate that our educational system cannot be 
static or regressive but must be one which ‘advance[s] to a better quality or state.’”); 
DeRolph v. State, 728 N.E.2d 993, 1001 (Ohio 2000) (“The definition of ‘thorough and 
efficient’ is not static; it depends on one’s frame of reference. What was deemed thorough 
and efficient when the state’s Constitution was adopted certainly would not be considered 
thorough and efficient today. Likewise, an educational system that was considered 
thorough and efficient twenty-five years ago may not be so today.”); Claremont Sch. Dist. 
v. Governor, 703 A.2d 1353, 1359 (N.H. 1997) (“A constitutionally adequate public
education is not a static concept removed from the demands of an evolving world.”);
Campbell Cty. School District v. State, 907 P.2d 1238, 1274 (Wyo. 1995) (“The definition
of a proper education is not static and necessarily will change.”); McDuffy v. Sec’y of
Exec. Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 555 (Mass. 1993) (“The content of the duty to
educate which the Constitution places on the Commonwealth necessarily will evolve
together with our society.”); Abbott by Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359, 367 (N.J. 1990) 
(“[A] thorough and efficient education consists of is a continually changing concept.”);
Robinson v. Cahill, 355 A.2d 129, 133 (N.J. 1976) (recognizing education as “constantly
evolving” and “that what seems sufficient today may be proved inadequate tomorrow”).
99. . McCleary v. State, 269 P.3d 227, 251 (Wash. 2012) (“The legislature has an 
obligation to review the basic education program as the needs of students and the demands 
514 ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol.  72:2 
framing that is inherent in litigation is a poor fit for the 
constitutional duty to deliver an adequate and equitable 
education, which cannot occur at a finite moment in time 
because “education is an ongoing project that requires constant 
vigilance—the failure [or success] of which can span over years 
and decades.”100 
As a result of adequacy and equity being both comparative 
and dynamic, they are also interminable demands meaning that 
these guarantees are unending and cannot be permanently 
fulfilled once and for all time.  That might strike some as a 
daunting if not hopeless proposition, but it should have just the 
opposite effect: it should embolden and inspire.  One reason it 
may not is because we are predisposed to thinking of 
constitutionality as a quality, state of being, or condition that can 
and should be permanently fixed and, when infringed, promptly 
and completely rectified.  We know the reality, however, is that 
violations of constitutional rights often go unremedied due to 
un- or under-enforcement by all three branches.101  Still, some 
might grimace at the thought of striving in vain towards 
constitutional guarantees with no conceivable end in sight.  That 
these guarantees are aspirational, however, does not make them 
discretionary and unenforceable,102  and the project is only in 
vain if we fail to make consistent and sustainable progress. 
of society evolve.”); McDuffy, 615 N.E.2d at 555 (“Our Constitution, and its education 
clause, must be interpreted ‘in accordance with the demands of modern society or it will be 
in constant danger of becoming atrophied and, in fact, may even lose its original 
meaning.’”). 
100. . See Black, supra note 84, at 469.
101. . See generally Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of 
Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1213 (1978); Barry 
Friedman, When Rights Encounter Reality: Enforcing Federal Remedies, 65 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 735 (1992); see also Black, supra note 84, at 464–66 (projecting some of “serious 
consequences” to current underenforcement of “education rights and duties” in state 
courts). 
102. . Several state courts—the Washington Supreme Court being among the first—
have rejected the argument that the education or equality provisions in state constitutions 
are purely hortatory or merely aspirational goals committed to the discretion of the 
legislature. See, e.g., William Penn Sch. Dist. v. Penn. Dep’t of Educ., 170 A.3d 414, 450 
(Pa. 2017); Gannon v. State, 319 P.3d 1196, 1223 (Kan. 2014); Rell, 990 A.2d at 261; 
Brigham v. State, 692 A.2d 384, 394 (Vt. 1997); Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 
655 N.E.2d 661, 665 (N.Y. 1995); Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 635 A.2d 1375, 1378 
(N.H. 1993); McDuffy, 615 N.E.2d at 524–28; Helena Elem. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 769 
P.2d 684, 689 (Mont. 1989); Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71, 85 (Wash. 
1978). 
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That, I submit, is the better way to think of constitutionality in 
education rights cases. 
III. FIDELITY TO EDUCATIONAL ADEQUACY
AND EQUITY 
As a test for constitutionality rather than conditional 
compliance, the reasonable fit standard seemingly forces a 
binary decision once it is satisfied requiring the court then to 
either terminate its jurisdiction or maintain its jurisdiction 
indefinitely.  That is precisely how justices on the Kansas 
Supreme Court viewed their options in Montoy, the precursor to 
the current, nearly decade-long Gannon litigation.103  The 
Montoy court elected to terminate jurisdiction after it concluded 
that the legislature enacted a school funding formula that 
substantially complied with the state constitution.104 The court 
reasoned that dismissal would avoid further protracted litigation, 
observing that other states struggled with developing a plan that 
would meet their highest state courts’ approval following 
remand to a trial court for further proceedings.105  The court also 
noted that it would potentially take up to three years to 
appreciate “the full financial impact” of the new formula—”a 
factor which would be important in any consideration of 
whether it provides constitutionally suitable funding.”106  In 
short, because the newly-enacted school funding formula 
essentially passed a reasonable fit standard, the court was 
inclined to terminate the matter and wait and see if it would 
actually achieve constitutionality. 
Justice Rosen concurred in the judgment of dismissal, 
warning that the case could “continue in perpetuity” and “extend 
into an indefinite future,” if a court had to continually assess 
constitutionality, for instance, whenever a different education 
model for adequacy were adopted or new adequacy cost study 
103. . See John Robb, et al., The Current State of School Finance in Kansas: The 
Kansas Legislature’s Occasional Negative Approach to Its Positive Constitutional Duty, 27 
KAN. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 329, 334–41 (2018) (recounting history of school funding 
litigation in Kansas including Montoy and Gannon). 
104. . Montoy v. State, 138 P.3d 755, 765 (Kan. 2006) (per curiam).
105. . Id. at 765–66. 
106. . Id. at 766. 
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were performed.107  Justice Rosen contended that the court itself 
had shifted in its own adoptions of different educational 
models.108  Taking exception to this “moving target” for 
constitutionality, Justice Rosen concluded, “the children of 
Kansas need a resolution of this matter now” convinced as he 
was that the legislature has substantially complied with this 
court’s prior orders.109 
Dissenting in part, Justice Beier insisted that the issue of 
constitutionality “remains squarely presented” noting the court 
had “consistently and correctly equated compliance with [its] 
directives to adherence to the legislature’s constitutional 
mandate.”110  Hence, unless and until there was full “compliance 
with [the court’s] directives,” the legislature could not be said to 
have “corrected the constitutional deficiencies in the school 
finance design.”111  Justice Beier suggested that only with the 
benefit of further evidence of the state’s record on adequacy and 
equity could the court say that it had reached the condition of 
being in accordance with the constitution.112  Justice Beier 
would have thus retained jurisdiction and remanded to the trial 
court “for further proceedings focused on the constitutionality of 
the finance system.”113 
Post-Montoy, the legislature failed to make good on its 
promises: “Between 2009 and 2011, [it] cut funding to education 
by over $500 million annually.”114  The Montoy plaintiffs moved 
to reopen their appeal for further proceedings in the trial court, 
but the Kansas Supreme Court denied that motion, which led to 
the filing of the Gannon litigation in 2010 that is still ongoing.115  
With the benefit of hindsight, both Justices Beier and Rosen 
were correct in their respective concurrence in and dissent from 
the court’s 2006 decision.  If constitutionality is to be 
understood as a quality, state, or condition of being in 
accordance with the constitution at particular moments in time, 
107. . Id. at 769 (Rosen, J., concurring).
108. . Id.
109. . Montoy, 138 P.3d at 769.
110. . Id. at 770 (Beier, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
111. . Id.
112. . Id.
113. . Id.
114. . Robb, et al., supra note 103, at 338.
115. . Gannon v. State, 319 P.3d 1196, 1206 (Kan. 2014).
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then Justice Rosen was surely correct that adequacy and equity 
are moving targets that would call for continual assessments, 
perhaps year after year, and certainly with each newly adopted 
education model or cost study estimates.  Likewise, Justice 
Beier was surely correct that if we equate constitutionality with 
full compliance with the constitution, then constitutionality will 
remain squarely presented until the adequacy and equity 
guarantees are permanently fulfilled. 
The question this dilemma provokes is not about Justice 
Rosen’s and Beier’s adherence to this traditional notion of 
constitutionality, but their allegiance to it.  Imagine if we could 
transcend this notion of constitutionality as being fixed and 
tethered to the strictures of the litigation process and judicial 
procedure.  What if, instead, we thought of constitutionality in 
education rights cases as demonstrable and durable fidelity to 
the constitution?  Not a state of being in accordance with the 
constitution, time-stamped 2019, but enduring faithfulness to its 
provisions, through steady, verifiable progress towards its 
guarantees.  That fidelity is compelled by the very nature of the 
constitutional guarantees in education rights cases—
interminable demands of adequacy and equity.  “Fidelity,” then 
as such, “is not a virtue but a precondition.  It’s not just a good 
thing, but the point of the practice of constitutional 
interpretation.”116  And yet fidelity is itself conditioned on a 
constitution that serves “as an approximation of what it says it 
is, and that requires at least some evidence of progress toward its 
ends.”117 
In the brief space remaining, I will sketch what rethinking 
constitutionality in this vein could entail in education rights 
cases. 
Demonstrable and durable fidelity to the constitution would 
neither force a court to terminate the case nor retain jurisdiction 
in perpetuity.  Rather, a court could suspend the case and 
116. . J.M. Balkin, Agreements with Hell and Other Objects of Our Faith, 65 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1703, 1705 (1997). 
117. . Sotirios A. Barber, Welfare and the Instrumental Constitution, 42 AM. J. JURIS.
159, 186 (1997); see also Sotirios A. Barber, Fidelity and Constitutional Aspirations, 65 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1757 (1997) (“Fidelity to an aspirational constitution requires that we 
confront and overcome the imperfections in ourselves that the Constitution presupposes, 
including even provisions of the constitutional document that might obstruct progress 
toward constitutional ends.”). 
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remand to a special master or a trial court to exercise jurisdiction 
periodically.  At each specified interval, the trial court or special 
master would make factual findings and render legal conclusions 
regarding the state’s fidelity to educational adequacy and equity. 
Again, I have proposed standards for that assessment and for 
legislative and judicial remedies that are better suited for that 
review than the reasonable fit standard.118  Either way, with the 
reasonable fit standard or another standard, the trial court judge 
or special master would review the state’s progress towards 
improving educational adequacy and equity. 
Between each interval of periodic jurisdiction, the court 
should entertain interim remedies. The concept of provisional, 
interim remedies is nothing new in education rights cases—they 
are typically prompted when “the legislature does nothing or 
issues a wholly inadequate response” to the high court’s 
order.119  The New Jersey Supreme Court, as active as its 
counterparts in Kansas and Washington, provides an example of 
the most extensive forms of such interim relief, at one point 
ordering “‘parity funding’, resourcing the [poor, urban] Abbott 
districts at the average level of an identified set of rich, suburban 
districts.”120  But the interim remedies need not be so 
demanding.  Indeed, two narrow remedies could potentially 
prove far more sustainable to the success of the long-term 
project for educational justice: data collection and public 
engagement projects. 
In terms of data collection, courts should require states to 
adopt “knowledge production” plans for adequacy and equity.121 
Researchers need to be able to track educational outcomes and 
experiences over time to confirm or revise adequacy cost 
estimates and also have access to data sets so that they can 
118. . See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
119. . See Christopher S. Elmendorf, From Educational Adequacy to 
Representational Adequacy: A New Template for Legal Attacks on Partisan Gerrymanders, 
59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1601, 1642–43 (2018) . 
120. . Id. at 1644; see also David G. Sciarra, Enhancing Court Capacity to Enforce 
Education Rights: Judicial Tools Used in Abbot v. Burke, FOUND. FOR LAW, JUSTICE & 
SOC’Y (2009), 
http://www.edlawcenter.org/assets/files/pdfs/publications/JudicialToolsUsedInAbbottvBur
ke.pdf [https://perma.cc/2W8H-AWQE]. 
121. . See Christopher S. Elmendorf & Darien Shanske, Solving “Problems No One 
Has Solved”: Courts, Causal Inference, and the Right to Education , 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. 
693, 734–35, 738–44 (2018). 
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control for other variables that might affect causal inferences.122  
State limitations on data collection hinder “the production of 
[this] constitutionally significant knowledge.”123  In addition, 
researchers and education policymakers need to develop more 
reliable ways for identifying and categorizing the needs of 
students for weighted student funding purposes and other equity 
measures.124 
Courts should also facilitate public engagement with the 
process of ensuring fidelity to educational adequacy and 
equity.125  Public engagement is vital to the ultimate success of 
an education rights case, which can be as dependent on public 
support as it is on an enforceable and effective remedy. 
School finance litigation often includes a long process of 
back and forth between the courts and the legislature in which 
the court orders the legislature to refashion its unconstitutional 
school finance formula, the legislature acts, and then the court 
responds as to whether the revised formula passes constitutional 
muster.  The court does not tell the legislature how to make 
change; the legislature is where the actual change must occur, 
and the court is the final arbiter of whether the change is 
sufficient. 
This characteristic of school finance litigation reinforces 
the necessity for public engagement because without the shifting 
of political balance in the form of the support of the broader 
public, court orders requiring legislative action are not 
implemented or sustained.126 
122. . See id.  . 
123. . Id at 697. 
124. . See generally id.; see also  Betty Malen, et al., The Challenges of Advancing 
Fiscal Equity in a Resource-Strained Context, 31 EDUC. POL’Y 615, 618–19 (2017); Helen 
F. Ladd, Reflections on Equity, Adequacy, and Weighted Student Funding, 3 EDUC. FIN. &
POL’Y 402, 411–12, 417–19 (2008). 
125. . See Michael A. Rebell & Robert L. Hughes, Efficacy and Engagement: The 
Remedies Problem Posed by Sheff v. O’Neill—and A Proposed Solution, 29 CONN. L. 
REV. 1115, 1153 (1997).  See generally PUBLIC ENGAGEMENT FOR PUBLIC EDUCATION: 
JOINING FORCES TO REVITALIZE DEMOCRACY AND EQUALIZE SCHOOLS (Marion Orr & 
John Rogers, eds. 2011).  
126. . Amanda R. Broun & Wendy D. Puriefoy, Public Engagement in School 
Reform: Building Public Responsibility for Public Education, 4 STAN. J. CIV. RTS. & CIV. 
LIBERTIES 217, 241–42 (2008). See generally Jonathan R. Werner, No Knight in Shining 
Armor: Why Courts Alone, Absent Public Engagement, Could Not Achieve Successful 
Public School Finance Reform in West Virginia, 35 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 61 (2002); 
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Courts should therefore conscript the parties, through 
mediation or court direction, to consider the whole spectrum of 
public engagement possibilities, including organizing coalitions 
of teachers, parents, and business and community leaders; 
forming panels of professional educators for cost studies; 
convening focus groups or town halls to elicit broad-based 
public education; discussion; and involvement in 
implementation of the state’s remedial scheme.127 
With the benefit of the data collected and public input, the 
trial court or special master will review the state’s progress 
towards improving adequacy and equity.  For reasons previously 
explained, that review should proceed without the state 
benefitting from any presumption of constitutionality.  Yet, at 
the same time, the plaintiffs should still bear the burden of 
proof—to show that there has been insufficient progress towards 
educational adequacy and equity, that the funding formulas are 
no longer reasonably calculated to achieve adequacy, or that the 
margin between adequacy and equity is disproportionate.128  The 
parties will have an opportunity for expedited appellate review 
of the judgment of the trial court or special master. 
If the courts conclude that the state is no longer in 
compliance, then of course the state should be ordered to cure 
the violations.  Should the courts determine that the state 
remains in conditional compliance, however, the process repeats 
itself, although a longer interval would then be justified —
perhaps four years instead of two, and then, as the state 
continues to demonstrate its good faith compliance, six years 
instead of four.  The state can accelerate the end of the court 
exercising periodic jurisdiction by instutionalizing the interim 
remedies or adopting other prophylactic remedies to ward of 
legislative relapses.  Arkansas, for instance, has institutionalized 
Molly A. Hunter, All Eyes Forward: Public Engagement and Educational Reform in 
Kentucky, 28 J.L. & EDUC. 485 (1999).  
127. . Cf. Molly Townes O’Brien, At the Intersection of Public Policy and Private 
Process: Court-Ordered Mediation and the Remedial Process in School Funding 
Litigation, 18 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 391, 433 (2003) (“Involving a broad range of 
interested constituencies in an effort to resolve school finance issues simply makes sense. 
Consensus building processes have been used successfully in a wide range of school 
disputes. Further, the kind of wide-ranging reform required in a school finance case may 
not be possible to implement without broad-based public support.”). 
128. . See Weishart, supra note 44, at 292.
2019 RETHINKING CONSTITUTIONALITY 521 
one such remedy: by law, the State is required to perform an 
adequacy cost study every two years.129 
If there is a sustained period of reasonable progress and 
fidelity to the constitutional guarantees of adequacy and equity, 
then the court should terminate its jurisdiction.  At that point, 
any new, subsequent challenge would have to proceed through 
the normal course of civil litigation, with any attendant 
presumptions and burdens that typically redound in the state’s 
favor. 
Justiciability presents no barrier to the court’s exercise of 
periodic jurisdiction.  As an initial matter, state courts 
effectuating state constitutional affirmative rights are not 
constrained by federal justiciability doctrines calibrated for 
Article III constitutional and prudential limitations.130  Standing, 
for instance, has not been a significant hurdle.  Even when 
children from other school districts are not parties to the case, 
courts have broadened standing and evidentiary parameters 
because the case presents issues “of significant, if not, 
paramount, public interests (school-aged children’s rights 
concerning public education).”131  And, as explained, even when 
the reasonable fit standard is satisfied in these cases, the 
plaintiffs remain not fully remediated, so a constitutional injury 
persists and, thus, so does standing and ripeness, at least until 
there is demonstrable and durable fidelity with the constitutional 
129. . ARK. CODE ANN. § 10-3-2102(a)(8), (j)(2) (2012).
130. . See generally Helen Hershkoff, Positive Rights and State Constitutions: The 
Limits of Federal Rationality Review, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1131 (1999); Helen Hershkoff, 
State Courts and the “Passive Virtues”: Rethinking the Judicial Function, 114 HARV. L. 
REV. 1833 (2001). 
131. . See Hoke Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. State, 599 S.E.2d 365, 376–77 (N.C. 2004) (“If 
inordinate numbers of [children] are wrongfully being denied their constitutional right to 
the opportunity for a sound basic education, our state courts cannot risk further and 
continued damage because the perfect civil action has proved elusive.”); Idaho Sch. for 
Equal Educ. Opportunity v. State, 129 P.3d 1199, 1203 (Idaho 2005) (“[A] judgment that 
[school] funding mechanism is unconstitutional will necessarily affect all school districts 
throughout the state, regardless of whether those districts presented evidence at trial, 
previously settled, or were never parties to this lawsuit.”); Rose v. Council for Better 
Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 202 (Ky. 1989) (“If a statute (or in this case, a system 
established by statutes) is not constitutionally valid, the existence or non-existence of a 
class of litigants is immaterial.”); see also Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71, 
80-83 (N.J. 1978); but see Abbott ex rel. Abbott v. Burke, 20 A.3d 1018, 1042–43 (N.J. 
2011) (“Simply stated, the present Abbott plaintiffs do not have standing. . .to seek 
vindication of the rights of children outside of the plaintiff class.”). 
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guarantees.  Separation of powers and political questions do not 
so much present textual obstacles,132  but they do force an 
underlying issue in education rights cases, namely, the proper 
role of state courts in determining constitutionality. That brings 
us back full circle to McCleary. 
Justice Johnson dissented from the court’s original 2012 
decision and subsequent order retaining jurisdiction and 
requiring the state to report periodically on implementation.  He 
argued that those actions breached separation of powers because 
the court did not “have enough information to know whether the 
legislature’s outlined progress is adequate” in light of “financial 
constraints and plans for future budgets” and because “the state 
of educational opportunities in various areas is ever-
changing.”133  Therefore, the court was simply “unqualified to 
assess the progress made or the legislature’s chances of 
achieving” constitutionally adequate school funding.134  But here 
Justice Johnson perhaps makes the best case for the court 
exercising periodic jurisdiction, rather than terminating the 
case—so that the court will be well-informed and well-
positioned to assess the state’s fidelity with the constitutional 
guarantees of educational adequacy and equity—that is, to 
assess constitutionality. 
IV. CONCLUSION
The perception that courts keep spinning their wheels in 
education rights cases is party driven by the glaring spotlight 
over a politically expedient finish line that never should have 
been marked there in the first place.  Believing there is such a 
destination, an attainable, fixed point of constitutional 
132. . See Scott R. Bauries, Is There an Elephant in the Room?: Judicial Review of
Educational Adequacy and the Separation of Powers in State Constitutions, 61 ALA. L. 
REV. 701, 745 (2010) (“[T]he explicitness of separation of powers doctrine in the 
constitutional text—does not have any discernable impact on whether courts choose to 
abstain from the merits of constitutional litigation on the very grounds of separation of 
powers.”); David G. Hinojosa, “Race-Conscious” School Finance Litigation: Is A Fourth 
Wave Emerging?, 50 U. RICH. L. REV. 869, 882, 882 n.70 (2016) (noting very few courts 
have dismissed cases as nonjusticiable on grounds that there is “a textually demonstrable 
constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department”). 
133. . Dissent to Order by Justice James M. Johnson at 4, 5, 8, McCleary v. State,
269 P.3d 227 (Wash. 2012) (No. 84362-7). 
134. . Id. at 8. 
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compliance, merely dooms courts and legislatures to failure in 
these cases.  Rather than judge whether the state has crossed an 
arbitrary line of probabilistic, temporary compliance, courts 
should judge whether the state is actually heading in the right 
direction with all children on board, improving adequacy and 
equity.  To say that judging progress towards these 
constitutional guarantees is not the role of courts is to consign 
the judiciary to task of waving the flag—ostensibly checkered 
but really white.  If we are truly committed to educational 
adequacy and equity, we can and should expect courts to stay 
the course, preoccupied not with judging an end but the distance 
from the beginning, until are all satisfied that the state has kept 
faith with the constitution. 
